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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000107-CA

vs.
SHEPARD WHEELER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted unlawful possession or use
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Sentencing in absentia, a. Did the sentencing court commit plain error by
finding that defendant's absence at sentencing was voluntary, where defendant had notice
of the hearing and was free to attend, but did not?
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850

P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain
error. Id. at 1209.
b. Did defense counsel perform ineffectively when he did not object to defendant's
being sentenced in absentia?
Where an ineffectiveness claim is first raised on direct appeal, this Court "must
decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter
of law." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App, 1993).
2. Alleged facts in mitigation, a. Did the sentencing court deny defense counsel
and the prosecutor the opportunity to present information in mitigation, thereby committing
plain error?
See standard of review for issue no. l.a.
b. Did defense counsel perform ineffectively by not advising the sentencing court
of allegedly mitigating material of which it was already aware?
See standard of review for issue no. 1 .b.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions:
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2).
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with
the following exceptions:
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
2

shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; . . .
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)&(b).
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence
of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the
defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity
to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment,
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material
to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence,
defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails
to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges. Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), and giving false identity to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507 (1999) (R. 2).
Plea hearing* On 3 December 1999, defendant pled guilty to attempted possession
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and the remaining count was dismissed
(R. 18-25,27-28).
In the plea hearing, defense counsel stated that the prosecution was "going to be
recommending affirmatively alcohol and drug treatment as well as mental health counseling"
(R. 53: 3). The prosecutor countered that no such recommendation was reflected in his
3

file (id). The court noted, "Well—but, if they chose not to, that would be a worthwhile
recommendation in any event which would have, however, no punitive [e]ffect on the
Defendant's status here before me today" (id). Defense counsel also informed the court
that her client "has some brain damage, so I took a little extra time [going over the Statement
of Defendant with him]" (R. 53: 4).
The court accepted defendant's guilty plea and informed him that sentencing was
set for 7 January 2000 (R. 53: 8-9). The court released defendant and ordered Adult
Probation and Parole (AP&P) to prepare a presentence report (R. 27). Defendant was
also given written notice that sentencing would be on 7 January 2000 (R. 26).
AP&P scheduled interview appointments for 22 December and 28 December, but
defendant, who was not incarcerated, failed to attend either (R. 29). Accordingly, AP&P
could not complete the presentence report as ordered (id). The court issued a non-bailable
warrant for defendant's arrest (R. 30-31).
Sentencing. A sentencing hearing was held on 7 January 2000 (R. 53:11). Defendant
was not present (R. 33). Defense counsel stated that predecessor counsel "informed me
that she has not been in touch with him and that he is not here this morning" (R. 53:
11). The court found that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings
and sentenced defendant to one year in jail (R. 33-34).
Findings. The court entered findings of fact and conclusion of law, finding as
follows:
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2.
That Defendant was verbally informed of the sentencing date
of January 7, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., before this Court, after he entered his plea
of guilty.
3.
That Defendant was given written notice of the sentencing date
after he entered his plea of guilty.

5.
That Defendant was not present before this Court on January
7, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., nor did he appear at any time during the Morning
Criminal Calendar.
6.
That counsel, Charles B. Corry, was present on January 7, 2000,
during the Morning Criminal Calendar and the latter had no explanation why
Defendant was not present in Court.
7.
That Defendant voluntarily, and without valid excuse, absented
himself from the presence of this Court on January 7, 2000, during the Morning
Criminal Calendar.
(R. 35-36). Defendant timely appealed (R. 40).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to the probable cause statement, on 13 October 1999, defendant was
stopped for crossing a street against the light (R. 3). A consent search discovered cocaine
(id). At his plea hearing, defendant admitted that he had "intentionally, knowingly attempted
to possess a controlled substance, specifically cocaine" (R. 53: 7).

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Sentencing in absentia, a. Defendant claims plain error occurred when the
trial court concluded it could sentence him in absentia. However, "a defendant not accused
of a capital crime waives his right to be present at sentencing by voluntary absence."
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). The trial court found that defendant
was voluntarily absent at sentence. The record reflects that defendant was given both
oral and written notice of the sentencing hearing and was at liberty to attend the hearing.
Thus, the court committed no error—clear, plain, or otherwise.
b. Since the court properly sentenced defendant in absentia, defense counsel was
not ineffective for not objecting.
2. Presentation of alleged facts in mitigation, a. Defendant argues the sentencing
court committed plain error under rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by
sentencing defendant without affording counsel an opportunity to present a plea bargain
and evidence bearing on the sentence. This argument fails on several grounds. First,
the trial court never refused to hear counsel; rather, counsel never requested to be heard.
Second, the record does not establish that any plea bargain existed, only that defense
counsel thought one did. Third, the sentencing court was already aware of all the issues
defendant claims should have been presented at sentencing.
b. Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails along with his plain
error argument.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT,
SENTENCING HIM IN ABSENTIA WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR
Defendant claims that "the Court erroneously concluded that it could sentence the
Defendant in absentia." Br. Aplt. at 7. He asserts plain error, as he must since the claim
is unpreserved. See id. at 8-9. By not objecting, defendant further claims, his counsel committed
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 7-8.
A.

The court did not plainly err by sentencing defendant in absentia.

To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain error.
Id. at 1209.
"[A] defendant not accused of a capital crime waives his right to be present at sentencing
by voluntary absence." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). "On the same
grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be
sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). In non-capital cases, "the
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effect as if defendant had been present; . . ." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2).
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Under rules 17 and 22, an absence is voluntary if the defendant has notice of the
proceedings and is at liberty to attend in the sense that he is not incarcerated elsewhere.
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110, 1111.
Here, the trial court found that defendant 'Voluntarily, and without valid excuse, absented
himself from the presence of this Court on January 7, 2000, during the Morning Criminal
Calendar" (R. 35-36). Defendant's claim in effect challenges this finding of fact.
This court will "review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard
and will not upset them unless they are 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."'
State v. Murphy, 872 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Chavez, 840 P.2d
846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), in turn quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
The finding at issue here was not clearly erroneous. Defendant received both oral and
written notice of the hearing (R. 26, 53: 8-9). Though not incarcerated, he failed to attend
two interviews with AP&P, resulting in a non-bailable warrant for his arrest (R. 29-31).
No evidence contradicts the court's finding. Defendant concedes he had notice of
the hearing. See Br. Aplt at 8. He also admits that the "reasons for his absence are unknown."
Id. Although defendant raises "the possibility that he was incarcerated on another matter,"
id., the record does not support this speculation. On the contrary, AP&P informed the court
that defendant was not in custody, at least as of 30 December 1999 (R. 29).
Consequently, the court here committed no error, plain or otherwise.

8

B.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to defendant's
being sentenced in absentia.

To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that his counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the result of the
trial or hearing. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The "proper standard
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance." Id. Thus, "the defendant
must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Id. at 688.
'""The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised
does not constitute ineffective assistance.'"" State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f34, 989 P.2d
52 (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Malmrose,
649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982))).
Since the court properly sentenced defendant in absentia, counsel's choice not to object
was not ineffective.
POINT II
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT PREVENT COUNSEL FROM
PRESENTING ANY INFORMATION UNKNOWN TO THE COURT
Defendant claims that the sentencing court committed plain error under rule 22(a),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by sentencing defendant without affording either the
prosecutor or defense counsel an opportunity to present evidence bearing on sentence. See Br.
Aplt. at 7. He further argues that his counsel was ineffective for not advising the court "that
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the Defendant suffers brain damage and that the State agreed, pursuant to plea negotiations,
to affirmatively recommend at sentencing that Defendant receive drug and alcohol treatment
and mental health counseling." Id. at 8.
A.

The sentencing court did not deny counsel the opportunity to speak
and, in any event, the court had already heard the information defendant
now claims should have been presented.

Defendant relies on rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Br. Aplt. at
6. That rule provides, "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment,
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
"The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material
to the imposition of sentence." Id.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate error, plain or otherwise. The trial court has
substantial discretion in conducting sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence. See State
v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985).
As the transcript of this abbreviated sentencing proceeding demonstrates, the court never
refused to hear counsel; neither attorney requested the opportunity to be heard (R. 53: 11-12).
Nothing in the record establishes or suggests that had either counsel requested the opportunity
the court would have denied it.
Defendant has also fails to demonstrate prejudice. He claims prejudice because he
was "sentenced to the maximum incarceration allowed by law [one year] rather than being
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given the benefit of his plea agreement which included affirmative recommendation by the
State that the Defendant be given an opportunity to receive drug and alcohol treatment and
mental health counseling." Br. Aplt. at 9.
The record does not support this claim. At the plea hearing, defense counsel stated
that she "had not noticed this before, but if [the prosecutor] will look at his file and [prior
defense counsel's] file notes, they are going to be recommending affirmatively alcohol and
drug treatment as well as mental health counseling" (R. 53: 3). The prosecutor replied, "That
is not reflected in mine. All that's reflected is just an offer of a Class A Misdemeanor"
(id). Notes in the defense file, without more, do not constitute a plea agreement. Moreover,
since the same judge sat at both the plea hearing and at sentencing (see R. 53), the court
was necessarily aware of this issue. The same is true for defendant's claim to suffer from
"some brain damage": it was mentioned at the plea hearing (R. 53: 4)
Furthermore, even had the sentencing judge been reminded of these issues, defendant's
absconding altered the sentencing calculus. The court "was entitled to aggravate appellant's
sentence on the basis of his failure to appear." State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691 (Ariz.
App. 1986). "Actions such as appellant's absconding from the jurisdiction demonstrate a
poor attitude and have been specifically held to provide appropriate bases for sentence
aggravation." Id. Compare State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (stating that since
the State did not charge defendant with bail-jumping, his absconding provided no "more
than nominal support for the imposition of consecutive sentences"), with State v. Parsons, 781
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P.2d 1275, 1282 (Utah 1989) (rejecting distinction between "criminal record" and "crimes
not passed on by a court" in capital sentencing), and State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah
1981) (approving sentencing court's consideration of evidence of prior crimes of which
defendant was acquitted).
B.

Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails on the prejudice prong.

Defendant claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance "when he failed to
advise the Court that the Defendant suffers brain damage and that the State agreed, pursuant
to plea negotiations, to affirmatively recommend at sentencing that Defendant receive drug
and alcohol treatment and mental health counseling." Br. Aplt. at 8.
The reviewing court should dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice if doing so is the easier course. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Dunn,
850 P.2d at 1226. It is the easier course here.
The State denies that counsel was deficient. But even assuming arguendo that he was
deficient in failing to advise the court of "some brain damage" suffered by defendant and
of defense counsel's belief in a plea agreement, defendant suffered no prejudice (R. 53: 3).
This is so because the court had already heard these claims at the plea hearing {see R. 53:
3-4). Indeed, the only record source for this information is the above-quoted colloquy from
a hearing presided over by the same judge who one month later sentenced defendant in absentia
(see R. 53). Thus, the court was fully apprized of every allegation defendant now claims
his attorney should have conveyed at sentencing.
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Moreover, as noted above, the record does not establish that any plea agreement existed,
only that one defense attorney believed that it did. Finally, any possibility that defendant
would have received counseling in lieu of jail time evaporated when he demonstrated his
unreliability by absconding. See Hoover, 728 P.2d at 691.
The likelihood that a defendant subject to a non-bailable arrest warrant who fails to
appear at sentencing will be placed on parole is remote, even if the judge is reminded that
defense counsel thought she had a plea agreement and that defendant suffers from "some
brain damage."
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim thus fails.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
This appeal presents no issues of sufficient complexity or novelty to merit setting the
matter for oral argument or issuing a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY submitted o

September 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

h
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by
first-class mail this<<s>£ /September 2000 to the following:
KRISTINE M. ROGERS
712 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellant
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FjUfl DISTBICT COttBT
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
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Telephone: (801)363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
\ND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
•

INIMNK M
. I »f* I ACT AND CONCI USION
OF LAW

PLmiliff,

vS

aseiNo. y-i^,i \^si>
SHEPARD WHEELER
n J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant
Defendant was scheduled to be senter** ••

January 7, 2000, at *-"o -n,

Defense Counsel, Charles B. Corry, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, >*&•• MI I t
representing Defendant and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy
Salt Lake County District Attome) , Defendant < a s n :: t pi esent
Based on the Court's record in the above entitled matter, the Court makes the following
Findings of I'm I .mil,l "onclusionof Law.
FINDINGS OF FAC I
1.
ill

That Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Unlawful Possession of a
I Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, on December 3,1999, before the this Court.

2.

That Defendant was veroaiiy

r

anuary 7, 2000,

at 8:3 0 a.m., before this Court, after he entered his plea of guilty.
3.

That Defendant was given written notice of the sentencing date after he entered

his plea of guilty.

0003?

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 991921193FS
Page 2

4.

That when Defendant entered his plea of guilty on December 3, 1999, and was

informed of the sentencing date, he was represented by counsel Deborah D. Kreeck-Mendez,
also from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.
5.

That Defendant was not present before this Court on January 7, 2000, at 8:30

a.m., nor did he appear at any time during the Morning Criminal Calendar.
6.

That counsel, Charles B. Cony, was present on January 7, 2000, during the

Morning Criminal Calendar and the latter had no explanation why Defendant was not present in
Court.
7.

That Defendant voluntarily, and without valid excuse, absented himself from the

presence of this Court on January 7,2000, during the Morning Criminal Calendar.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Rules 17(a)(2) and 22(b), U.R. Crim. P.,
the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Defendant may be sentenced on January 7, 2000, at
8:30 a.m., without being present before the Court
DATED this

___
JJ^-day of _ _Jtlb
w

' 200°
BY TffiE COURT:

:z- --i

FREDERICK
Judge

nnmR

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 991921193FS
Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I iimihy H.'iiiiv iiui .1 line .mil i n n n l i upv nl Ihc foreeoina '• '•"' * '.va* ."'Inered to
Charles B Corry, Counsel for Defendant Shepard Wheeler, by placing *
Defender Association box located in the Office of the District Attorney f<>!

. ; . Lke Countv on

this\£)f^day ol January, JlH»0.

yto/o

00037

HLM DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN H

uA\ lu t. \ OCUM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

By—yL

\ \

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff.

-vs-

Case No. 991921193FS

SHEPARD WHEELER

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.
The Court having reviewed the lnvv niJ having entered Findings of Fact and the
Conclusion of Law based thereon:
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant be sentenced in absentia on January 7,2000, during
the Morning Criminal Calendar.

DATED thi

2000
^

'Irdayof jM.s

BY THE,'
THE COURT

HON
Third

00038

ORDER
CaseNo.991921193FS
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to
Charles B. Corry, Counsel for Defendant Shepard Wheeler, by placing it in the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association box located in the Office of the District Attorney for Salt Lake County on
this g j ^ day of January, 2000.
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JENNIS FREDERICK,
ii i

i

ni^trnt

county

Court,

courthouse,

without
Salt

HI u i r y

Lake

City,
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KENNETH K.
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Defendant.
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1 calendar incident to an arraignment. Do you
2 anticipate a continuing not-guilty plea or do you
3 want a trial date?
i
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: No, Your Honor. He
5 will plead guilty to Attempted Possession of a
6 Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor.
7
THE COURT: And to your knowledge,
8 Ms. Kreeck Mendez, arc there any other
9 representations being made by the State here in
10 resolution of this claim?
11
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, I haven"' t
12 noticed this before, but if Mr. Parker will look at
13 his file and Ms. Garland's file notes, they are going
14 to be recommending affirmatively alcohol and drug
15 treatment as well as mental health counseling.
16
MR. PARKER: That is not reflected in
17 mine. All that's reflected is just an offer of a
18 Class A Misdemeanor.
THE COURT: Well -- but, if they chose
20 not to, that would be a worthwhile recommendation in
21 any event which would have, however, no punitive
22 affect on the Defendant's status here before me
23 today
?4
You have discussed the wisdom of this
25 plea with your client, Ms. Kreeck Mendez?
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2
THE COURT; All right Number 4 on the
3 calendar, State of Utah v. Shepard Wheeler, Case
4 No. CR99-1193.
5
Ms. Kreeck-Mcndez, you are appe*
6 this matter for the Defendant?
?
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I am, Ms, Garland v
8 actually his lawyer. I've talked to him, gone over
9 this. He's fine with me handling this case.
io
THE COURT: Henceforth or for this
11 morning?
12
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: For this morning.
J3
THE COURT: You, sir, are Shepard
14 Wheeler; is that correct?
15
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
16
THE COURT: And you understand
17 Ms, Kreeck Mendcz is appearing for your lawyer,
18 Ms. Garland?
19
THE D E F E N D A N T : yes, SIT, i do.
20
THE COURT: That's agreeable with you?
21
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
22
THE COURT: And, Mr. Parker, you are here
23 on behalf of the State?
24
MR. PARKER: I am.
25
THE COURT: This matter is on the
* "••'
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i
IMS. KREECK MENDEZ: I have.
2
THE COURT: And you've gone ova the
3 Statement of the Defendant with him?
4
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I have. And, Y our
5 Honor, he has some brain damage, so I took a little
6 extra time. We talked about it, talked about it in
? terms of the case and just - 1 carefully went
8 through it in very simple terms.
9
THE COURT: And you are persuaded
10 therefore that he understand the effect and meaning
ii of what he's about to do here?
12
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I believe he does.
J\
THE COURT: Mr. Parker, does that fairly
14 state the proposed resolution from your perspective
is
MR.PARKER: it does, Your Honor.
i
THE COURT: Mr. Wheeler, do you
17 understand what's being proposed here?
18
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.
19
THE COURT: And you have talked this over
20 with not one but probably both of your lawyers?
21
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
22
THE COURT: And you've gone over the
23 Statement of the Defendant with your lawyer,
24 Ms. Kreeck Mendez?
25
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

,

Pace 1 - Page 4

|

M^M/ua^ii

ociNiiiiN^iNU, 12-3-99 & 1-7-00

Page 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
119
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: And you understand that
statement?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at
all about it?
THE DEFENDANT: NO, I don't.
THE COURT: Have any threats or promises
been made to you or against you to get you to enter
this plea of guilty, other than what's been stated
here in open court?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: In other words, you are doing
this freely and voluntarily, Mr. Wheeler?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am.

THE COURT: You understand, as a criminal
Defendant, by entering a plea of guilty you are
waiving certain constitutional rights that you
otherwise have?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Including the right to be
tried by a jury of eight people, the right to require
the State to prove their case against you beyond a
reasonable doubt, to the unanimous satisfaction of
that jury of eight people, the right to confront and
cross-examined witnesses produced by the Stale
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1 against you, the right to compel the attendance of
2 witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to you, the
3 right to remain silent during the trial if you choose
I 4 or to take the stand and testify in your own behalf
J 5 if you chose, and the right to appeal in the event a
6 jury finds you guilty of the charges that are tried;
7 all of which rights as well as any others on that
I 8 statement that we may not have now discussed, you are
9 waiving by the entry of the guilty plea. Do you
110 understand?
II
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
12
THE COURT: And knowing of those waivers,
113 do you want to proceed with this plea arrangement
14 that the lawyers have worked out?
15

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

16
THE COURT: And you are still doing this
17 freely and voluntarily?
18

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

19
THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that
20 statement at this time?
21
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
22
THE COURT: YOU may do SO.
23
The Defendant and both Counsel have
24 signed the Statement of the Defendant.
25
Mr. Wheeler, you understand by having
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signed this statement you are admitting as true and
correct the following facts and elements involved in
the Class A Misdemeanor crime of Attempted Possession
of a Controlled Substance?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: specifically that at the
location of 220 West 300 South in Salt Lake County on
the 13th of October of 1999, you intentionally,
knowingly attempted to possess a controlled
substance, specifically cocaine. Those facts and
elements are true and correct; are they not?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand that those
facts and elements constitute: a Class A Misdemeanor
crime for which you could be sentenced by this Court
to a period of up to one year in the Salt Lake County
Jail and/or fined up to the sum of $2,500 plus a
surcharge on any fine imposed. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

21
'THE COURT: Knowing the potential penalty
22 involved here, do you want to proceed with this
23 arrangement that the lawyers have worked out?
24

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

25

THE COURT. And you are still doing it
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am.

THE COURT: I will accept the Statement
of the Defendant. I find that he's executed the same
freely voluntarily and knowingly.
To the charge set forth in the
Information, Mr. Wheeler, which has now been amended,
Count I, Attempted Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, what is
your plea?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm guilty.
THE COURT: I will accept the guilty plea
and dismiss Count n of the Information in the
interest of justice.
Mr. Wheeler, you have the right now to be
sentenced in this matter in no less than two nor more
than 45 days from today's date. In addition, you
have therightfor good cause shown in no more than
30 days from today's date to move to set aside the
guilty plea entered here.
I believe a presentence report would be
appropriate.
Ms. Kreeck Mendez, do you agree?
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Yes.
THE COURT: We'll schedule the matter for
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1 sentencing...
2
THE CLERK,.: January 7th.
3
THE COURT: January the 7th.
4 Mr. Wheeler, that is a Friday morning at 8:30. if ou
5 be here with your lawyer for sentencing at that
6 time. Do you 'understand?
7
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
8
THE COURT: In the meantime, I am going
9 to give you a referral slip here that you are to take
10 with you. As soon as you leave this courtroom, you
11 go to the Office of Adult Probation & Parole, which
112 is listed on that slip, and give them the information
13 they need to do the presentence report; got it?
14
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
15
THE COURT: Is there any reason known to
16 the Prosecution why the Defendant shouldn't remain on
117 release pending sentencing?
18
MR. PARKER: No, Your Honor.
19
THE COURT I am going to allow you,
20 Mr. Wheeler, to remain out pending sentencing so long
21 as you comply with the terms and conditions of your
22 release without fail; do you follow me?
23
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
24
THE COURT: All right Counsel, then if
125 there's nothing further, then that will be the order.

1
P R O C E E D I N (J S
2
(January 7, 2000.)
3
THE COURT: Counsel, thank, you, This
4 is State of Utah v. Shepard Wheeler, Case No.
5 CR99-1193.
6
Mr. Cony, have you 'been in touch "» ith
? Mr 'Wheeler.
8
MR. CORRY: "Y our Honor , Ms. Garland
9 informed me that she has not been in touch with him
10 and that he is not here this morning.
11
THE COURT: Mr. Shepard Wheeler is not in
12 the (courtroom? Or anyone on his behalf?
13
I will, Counsel, make the determination
11 at this stage that he's voluntarily absented himself
15 from these proceedings. He entered a plea of guilt)
16 on the 3rd of December of 1999, to the Class A
17 Misdemeanor charge of Attempted Possession of a
18 Controlled Substance, was directed to appear for
19 presentence report; did not do so. A warrant was
20 previously issued for his arrest. And given the fact
21 that he has failed to comply with the Court's
22 previous orders, 1 will sentence him to a period of
23 one year in the Salt Lake County Jail; the commitment
24 to be issued forthwith.
25
Mr. Updegrove, if you will prepare the
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MS. KREECK MENDhz,; Okay, thank you.
MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Hearing adjourned)
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findings of fact and conclusions of law and order
barring voluntarily termination and submit those to
me, I'd appreciate it
And thank you, Mr. Cony.
MR. CORRY: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Hearing adjourned.)
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TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

)

)
County of SALT LAKE

)

I, BILLIE WAY. CCT. do hereby certify that I
am a Certified Court Transcriber in and for the Stale
of Utah;
That I reduced the proceedings aforesaid to
print from videotape to the best of my ability;
I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS MY HAND this the 8th day of February,
2000.
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